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Summary
Observation of another’s action can selectively facili-
tate the brain’s motor circuits for making the same
action [1–3]. A ‘‘mirror-matching mechanism’’ might
map observed actions onto the observer’s own motor
representations [4, 5]. Crucially, this view suggests
that the brain represents others’ actions like one’s
own. However, this hypothesis has been difficult to
test because the experience of one’s own body differs
from that of others’ bodies with respect to viewpoint,
morphological features, familiarity, and the hallmark
feature of kinaesthetic experience. We used an estab-
lished method for manipulating the sense of body
ownership (‘‘rubber-hand illusion’’) to compare effects
of observing actions that either were or were not illu-
sorily attributed to the subject’s own body. We show
that observing another’s actions facilitated the motor
system, whereas observing identical actions, which
were illusorily attributed to the subject’s own body,
showed the opposite pattern. Thus, motor facilitation
strongly depends on the agent to whom the observed
action is attributed. This result contradicts previous
concepts of equivalence between one’s own actions
and actions of others and suggests that social differ-
entiation, not equivalence, is characteristic of the
human action system.
Results and Discussion
Mirror matching has strong implications for the self-
other distinction [6]. The purpose of the mirror system
appears to be social because it represents others in
order to understand their actions [4]. It also implies
a shared representation [6, 7] between ourselves and
others because the same neuronal representations are
*Correspondence: s.bosbach@psychol.ucl.ac.ukactivated for actions made by either agent. However,
we do not normally confuse others with ourselves; we
can clearly attribute actions to either ourselves or to
another agent. Classical mirror-matching theories are
silent on how the brain performs this attribution. In one
more recent view, actions are initially represented in
a motoric but agent-neutral format (‘‘shared representa-
tion’’). In this view, motor facilitation should be equal for
observation of either one’s own actions or those of
another agent. Perceptual identification of an action as
one’s own or as another’s would then involve an addi-
tional process (the ‘‘Who’’ system), which attributes
actions to specific agents, perhaps on the basis of view-
point-specific body representations in the occipital
cortex [8, 9].
Alternatively, mirror matching may involve derivative
representation of another’s actions. Because ‘‘the other
is like the self’’ [7], observing another’s actions should
partially activate the corresponding structures in one’s
own brain. In this view, motor facilitation should occur
during observation of both one’s own actions and those
of others but should be greater for self-observation. Fi-
nally, a radical hypothesis suggests that representation
of one’s own actions may derive from representation of
another’s actions: ‘‘me like you’’ [7]. Motor facilitation
should then be greater during observation of the actions
of others than when observing one’s own.
Action-observation studies have rarely investigated
the self-other distinction directly, so these three predic-
tions have not been explicitly compared. An ideal exper-
iment would compare cortical excitability during obser-
vation of one’s own actions or those of another person.
However, these two situations normally differ in their
sensorimotor context as well as in social respects, mak-
ing unambiguous interpretation difficult. For example,
viewpoint, morphological, and familiarity differences
between one’s own body and those of others mean
that visual stimulation would differ across conditions.
In addition, observing one’s own action involves not
only visual experience, but also efferent and afferent ex-
periences of action. These experiences are absent when
one is watching others’ actions [10]. A more direct com-
parison between subjects’ perception of self and their
perception of others may come from holding visual
and proprioceptive inputs constant and using top-
down factors to induce subjects to treat a single visual
input as their own body or another’s.
We thus manipulated body ownership by using the
rubber-hand illusion. We then investigated how attribut-
ing a viewed hand to the self or to another person influ-
enced action observation (Figures 1 and 2; see also the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures available on-
line). When subjects watch a rubber hand being stroked
while they feel synchronous stroking of their own un-
seen hand, they feel that the rubber hand becomes
part of their body [11, 12]. Identical asynchronous strok-
ing has no effect [12, 13]. Thus, the sense of owning the
rubber hand requires congruence of visual and tactile
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ownership have been identified in premotor [14] and
sensorimotor cortices [15]. The rubber-hand illusion
therefore allows balanced comparison between the
self and the other because a single stimulus (here, the
hand of another person rather than a rubber hand) is
either linked to the self or not depending on the pattern
of previous stimulation. We used a real human hand
instead of the conventional rubber hand because sev-
eral studies show stronger mirroring effects for view-
ing a live action than for viewing artificial equivalents
[16–19].
We then used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
to directly compare action facilitation effects produced
Figure 1. Experimental Setup
The subject sat resting his or her right arm on a table. The arm was
hidden under a surface, which could appear either as a mirror or as
transparent glass, according to computer-controlled illumination
under the surface. An experimenter’s right arm was positioned in
front of the subject’s midline. The illumination was controlled so
that the subject could either see this arm or not. The distance be-
tween the subject’s and the experimenter’s hands was 34 cm. Tac-
tile stimulation was applied simultaneously to the subject’s and the
experimenter’s index finger by two identical paintbrushes mounted
on computer-controlled motors. In the synchronous condition, the
two paintbrushes stroked the subject and the experimenter with
identical onset times, directions, speeds, and durations. In the asyn-
chronous condition, the two paintbrushes moved with different on-
set times, directions, speeds, and durations, but the total stimula-
tion of the skin was identical. Synchronous stroking induced the
illusion that the experimenter’s hand was part of the subject’s own
body (see Figure S1). Once the illusion was established, the experi-
menter’s index finger made unpredictable abduction movements.
On some trials, the subject received a TMS pulse over the motor cor-
tex shortly after observing the experimenter’s action so that how ob-
servation of action influenced cortical excitability could be probed.by watching an action attributed to another’s body
with the facilitation effects produced by observing
actions of a body that appears to be one’s own. The
rubber-hand illusion and the motor facilitation to TMS
are established paradigms for manipulating ownership
and for studying cortical mirroring mechanisms, respec-
tively [1, 11]. We have combined these techniques to
compare cortical representation for actions performed
by the self and others. This approach permits an exper-
imental answer to a traditional conceptual question in
social cognitive neuroscience: Do we represent others
as a derivative of ourselves (‘‘you like me’’), do we repre-
sent ourselves as derivatives of others (‘‘me like you’’),
do we represent actions in an agent-neutral way [6,
20], or do we represent other agents as quite different
from ourselves?
Cortical Excitability
Figure 3 shows mean motor-evoked potential (MEP) am-
plitudes in each condition for subjects’ right first-dorsal
interosseus (FDI) and right abductor digiti minimi (ADM).
The latter served as a control muscle irrelevant to the
observed action. Baseline MEP amplitude did not differ
between pretest and posttest blocks (p > 0.4), so base-
line data were averaged. All experimental conditions
produced MEP increases above the baseline for FDI
(p < 0.006) but not for ADM (p > 0.3). To compare
MEPs between experimental conditions, we therefore
calculated a facilitation ratio by normalizing each sub-
ject’s experimental MEP amplitudes by using that sub-
ject’s average baseline MEP amplitude.
To investigate whether the sense of ownership affected
corticalmechanismsofactionobservation,weperformed
2 3 2 ANCOVAs on the facilitation ratios for each mus-
cle by using factors of ownership (self-synchronous/
other-asynchronous) and observed experimenter action
(no action/experimenter action; Figure 3; see also Fig-
ure S2). We controlled for the known facilitation of MEPs
by background EMG level [21] by including EMG activity
as a covariate (Figure S3).
Facilitation ratios for FDI showed no main effects of
either ownership or observed-experimenter action
(F1,12 = 1; p > 0.5) but a significant interaction between
these factors (F1,12 = 6.97; p = 0.023). Observation of
an experimenter’s index-finger movements facilitated
MEPs in the other-asynchronous condition but sup-
pressed them in the self-synchronous condition relative
to observation of a static hand. Identical analysis
showed no interaction in the ADM (p = 0.984).
We used an established bodily illusion to manipulate
body ownership and then compared the cortical repre-
sentation of observed actions linked to the self or to an-
other agent. A version of the rubber-hand illusion [11–13]
allowed to us to control experimentally whether subjects
experienced that an experimenter’s hand was in fact
their own. We then compared MEPs evoked by motor
cortical TMS at the time that the observed hand made
voluntary actions with MEPs recorded in randomly inter-
leaved control trials when the subject viewed the exper-
imenter’s static hand. Action observation facilitated the
subjects’ own motor system when the moving hand was
attributed to another agent. Conversely, when the sub-
jects experienced the experimenter’s hand as belonging
to their own body, action observation had a qualitatively
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Subjects watched an experimenter’s hand being stroked while they felt similar stroking of their own unseen hand. Visual and tactile stimulation
could be synchronous or asynchronous, according to block. In a subsequent experimental stage, occasional synchronous stroking was inter-
spersed with passive observation of occasional finger movements made by the experimenter. The observed actions were followed by TMS on
random trials.different effect and tended to suppress rather than in-
crease cortical excitability. The interaction was specific
to the muscle involved in the observed action. There
were no main effects of either the rubber-hand illusion
(synchronous versus asynchronous) or of the observed
action itself on cortical excitability. This excludes non-
specific accounts based on increases in cortical excit-
ability due to illusions or due to the arousal value of
visual or biological motion.
Enhanced cortico-spinal excitability during action ob-
servation has been reported previously [1–3, 22]. We
replicated this basic effect and extended it in a number
of ways. First, previous studies have compared MEPs
measured in the context of extended periods of action
observation or baseline blocks. Using a more event-
related approach, we compared facilitation evoked by
viewing a hand that either did or did not perform an
action on randomly interleaved trials. We show that
cortical facilitation involves an immediate and somato-
topically specific response to a currently observed ac-
tion and cannot be attributed to longer-term contextual
fluctuations of the subject’s cortical state.
Second, we show that action observation produces
somatotopically specific effects in the motor cortex.
Viewing index-finger movements influenced the excit-
ability of circuits controlling the subject’s index-finger
muscle but had no effect on circuits controlling a muscle
moving the little finger [2]. In other words, our results
confirm a fine somatotopic distribution that can target
individual digits within the same motor map [23].Most importantly, our study shows a clear difference
between the cortical effects of observing actions linked
to the self and actions performed by others. Observing
others’ actions facilitated the motor system. Observing
an identical action that was attributed to one’s own
body had a quite different effect. This suggests that the
neural mechanisms underlying action observation are in-
trinsically social. These mechanisms map the actions of
others to corresponding actions on one’s own body but
do not simply represent the other agent as a derivative of
[7], or even an equal to, the self. Our results support nei-
ther ‘‘you like me’’ theories of social cognition nor theo-
ries of ‘‘shared representation.’’ Such theories require
a common, agent-neutral representation for one’s own
actions and for the actions of others [6, 20]. In contrast,
we found a significantly agent-specific representation
in the primary motor cortex.
A few studies have previously attempted to investi-
gate the self-other distinction in action observation.
One study [24] measured cortical excitability while
subjects watched videos of their own hand or another
person’s hand performing index-finger abduction move-
ments. They found facilitation above a baseline in both
cases but no difference between self and other obser-
vation. Our results clearly contradict this finding. We
speculate that their stimuli may not have generated an
unambiguous self-other difference. Indeed, Daprati
et al. found that subjects frequently attributed another
person’s hand to themselves when they were shown
videos of either their own or another person’s manual
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1833Figure 3. Mean + Standard Error, SE, Cortical Excitability of FDI and ADM after Action Observation or during Viewing of a Static Hand in Each
Ownership Condition
(A and B) Average MEP size in each condition.
(C and D) Facilitation ratios in the experimental blocks relative to averaged baseline blocks.actions [25]. Here, we have controlled the linkage of ob-
served action to the self or to another person by using
the rubber-hand illusion rather than relying on explicit
subject reports.
Maeda et al. [26] reported greater MEP facilitation for
first-person than for third-person views of grasping ac-
tion. However, this may reflect a purely visual, rather
than social, difference. Saxe et al. [27] compared brain
activation when subjects viewed static body-part im-
ages from egocentric and heterocentric perspectives.
They found greater BOLD responses in the sensory cor-
tex for egocentric than for heterocentric views, suggest-
ing that visual perspective could influence sensorimo-
tor systems independently of action observation. Our
study, in contrast, kept visual stimulation constant
across conditions and manipulated the attribution of ac-
tions to the self or to another person with an established
illusion of body ownership.
Could the absence of facilitation in our self condition
be due to a cognitive conflict derived from a mismatch
between visual and proprioceptive feedback? In this
condition, subjects observed actions of a hand that
they attributed to themselves, but the kinaesthetic feed-
back associated with normal voluntary action was ab-
sent. Several strands of evidence suggest that the lack
of facilitation in the self condition reflects a genuine fea-
ture of neural representation of actions attributed to the
self and not merely a response to intersensory conflict.
First, intersensory conflict per se did not influence corti-
cal excitability. The asynchronous stroking condition of
the rubber-hand illusion induced a dramatic conflict be-
tween visual and somatosensory information but did notproduce a main effect of stroking pattern on MEP facili-
tation. Second, questionnaire responses and proprio-
ceptive measurements both suggest that any intersen-
sory conflict due to the observation of self-actions was
minimal. Specifically, the rubber-hand illusion was as
strong in the induction phase, where no intersensory
conflict was present, as in the experimental phase,
where such conflict may have occurred. Third, func-
tional imaging studies of conflict between visual feed-
back and motor intention have not reported suppression
of primary motor or premotor areas [28, 29]. Indeed,
studies of conflict focus on prefrontal areas that gener-
ally have excitatory projections to the motor system [28,
29]. Thus, absence of facilitation for one’s own action
cannot easily be explained as a response to conflict.
Rather, we suggest that cortical suppression is a func-
tional response to viewing one’s own actions. Brass
et al. [30] have reported an anterior frontomedial and
right temporoparietal inhibitory network that sup-
presses a natural tendency to imitate others and thus
prevents inappropriate responses. This would be even
more important for preventing inappropriate persevera-
tion or entrainment when viewing one’s own actions. In
normal voluntary action, this observation-evoked sup-
pression may be masked by the additional cortical facil-
itation associated with motor output [21].
In conclusion, our results confirm that observation of
others facilitates the motor system. The facilitation is
caused by immediate observation of the current action.
Moreover, facilitation strongly depends on the agent to
whom the observed action is attributed. Actions attrib-
uted to another person facilitate the observer’s motor
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not, and in fact such observations tend to suppress
the observer’s motor system. The motor system there-
fore includes a representation of other agents as qualita-
tively different from the self. The motor system differen-
tiates between the self and the other rather than equates
them. Our results strongly support previous suggestions
that the motor system plays a key role in social cogni-
tion [4] and may underlie key developments in human
social evolution, such as communication and social
interaction.
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Supplemental Data include Experimental Procedures and three fig-
ures and can be found online at http://www.current-biology.com/
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